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Abstract 
  
This paper examines the impact of a firm’s social performance on the CEO’s employment 
prospects. We track departing CEOs’ subsequent employment records and find that the social 
performance of their previous employers improves their labor market outcomes. These CEOs are 
more likely to find a new executive position, and the new employer is more likely to be a publicly 
traded company. For the subsample of CEOs finding new executive positions at public firms, we 
find that a CEO whose previous employer has stronger social performance is more likely to move 
up to a larger firm. Finally, using a Cox proportional hazard model, we find that strong social 
performance of the previous employer helps CEOs find their next executive positions sooner.  
Overall, our results suggest that corporate social performance enhances CEOs’ labor market 
potentials.  
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1. Introduction 
 A large stream of literature in economics, finance, and accounting suggests that future labor 
market prospects affect managerial decision making at their current employers (e.g., Fama 1980; 
Holmstrom 1999). Managers’ future labor market prospects should depend on their ability. Absent 
perfect information about managerial ability, the labor market is likely to take a firm’s current and 
past performance as a signal of the quality of its CEO. Prior research suggests that potential 
employers use corporate financial performance to assess external executive hires. That is, a firm’s 
superior financial performance significantly enhances its executives’ job market prospects (Fee 
and Hadlock 2003), and financial distress and corporate failures substantially reduce the chances 
of CEOs securing comparable positions after departure (Gilson 1989; Houston and James 1993; 
Cannella, Jr., Fraser, and Lee 1995). There is also evidence that the external labor market penalizes 
managerial misconduct in reporting financial results (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006).  
While prior research has primarily focused on financial results as a measure of corporate 
performance, recent studies show that various stakeholders, such as some institutional shareholders, 
have been increasingly focusing on social performance as a performance metric (e.g., Dimson, 
Karakaş, and Li 2015). Over the last decade, both the number of shareholder proposals on 
environmental and social issues filed with the SEC and the approval rates for these proposals have 
substantially increased (e.g., Glac 2014; Welsh and Smith 2011; Flammer 2015). Asset managers 
worldwide in charge of trillions of dollars incorporate environmental, social, and governance 
concerns into their investing decisions (Dimson, Karakaş, and Li 2015). Substantial economic 
resources are allocated to socially responsible corporate activities (Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman 
2012). Despite its growing significance, there is no evidence so far on whether and how the 
managerial labor market considers a firm’s social performance in assessing managerial quality. 
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We address this question by examining the impact of corporate social performance on the 
likelihood of departing CEOs obtaining new executive positions and the gap between employment. 
Socially responsible investments can be value enhancing or value destroying for 
shareholders. Depending on the value implications of such activities, social performance can 
convey different information about managerial quality. Classical economic theory suggests that 
firms should not internalize the negative externalities they exert on non-shareholding stakeholders 
such as communities, employees, or the environment (e.g., Pigou 1920). Friedman’s (1970) well-
known comments in his New York Times article argue that “the social responsibility of business 
is to increase its profits.” Extending this view, some believe that investment in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is a manifestation of agency problems inside the firm (Cheng, Hong, and 
Shue 2016; Masulis and Reza 2015). This view suggests that managers engage in CSR activities 
to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders (Kruger 2015). In this scenario, CSR 
engagement is likely viewed as a negative indicator of CEO quality and should impair CEOs’ labor 
market prospects.  
Two other views of CSR, as summarized by Benabou and Tirole (2010), suggest a positive 
impact of CSR on firm value. One view is that CSR practices allow management to take a long-
term perspective and maximize intertemporal profits, consistent with shareholder interests. 
Another view is that CSR activities are a form of delegated philanthropy, which maximizes 
shareholder welfare and serves as an efficient channel to express personal values on behalf of firms’ 
investors (Hart and Zingales 2017). Consistent with the implications of these two views, a number 
of studies provide examples of mechanisms through which CSR can enhance shareholder wealth 
(Edmans 2011; Dimson, Karakas, and Li 2015; Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk 2005; 
Flammer 2015; Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Dowell, Hart, and Yeung 2000). Under these views, 
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corporate social performance can help CEOs develop a reputation as high-quality managers 
creating shareholder value. Furthermore, to the extent that corporate CSR policies reveal managers’ 
altruism or a belief of doing the right thing (Benabou and Tirole 2006; Gao, Lisic and Zhang 2014), 
a firm’s social performance can signal CEOs’ high ethical standards. All these arguments indicate 
that CEOs with strong social performance should be rewarded with better job market prospects.  
We examine the empirical question of whether a firm’s social performance is related to the 
CEO’s future job market opportunities by compiling a sample of CEO departures in U.S. public 
firms from 1993 to 2012. We end the sample period in 2012 to allow time for departing CEOs to 
find new jobs. We limit the age of the departing CEOs to be under 60 to exclude departures due to 
retirements. Then, through a manual search, we track their post-departure employment records up 
to 2016.  
We assess a firm’s social performance with a summary CSR score that reflects various 
aspects of social responsibility using the social ratings data issued by MSCI ESG STATS (MSCI 
hereafter). Similar to prior research (e.g., Gao et al. 2014), we classify a firm as having strong 
social performance if it has more CSR strengths than concerns. We estimate a linear probability 
model with industry and year fixed effects and find that CEOs leaving firms with strong social 
performance are more likely to secure new executive positions, after controlling for the size and 
financial performance of their previous employers and CEO characteristics such as age and tenure. 
Considering that executive positions at publicly traded companies are in general associated with 
higher visibility and better pay than comparable positions at privately held companies, we also 
capture managerial career prospects by the likelihood of obtaining an executive position at a public 
firm. Our analysis indicates that CEOs leaving firms with strong CSR performance are also more 
likely to be hired as executives by public firms. These results suggest that the managerial labor 
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market rewards CEOs for their social performance. Our inference is robust to a number of 
alternative specifications, including measuring corporate social performance over different 
windows before CEO departures, using a conditional logit regression model, and controlling for 
general managerial ability following Custódio et al. (2013). 
While the social performance of executives’ previous employers has been pre-determined 
by the time they receive the new appointments, mitigating the concern for endogeneity to some 
extent, it is still possible that both corporate social performance and CEOs’ career prospects are 
under the influence of some unobservable factors and exhibit a spurious correlation. To address 
this issue, we employ an instrumental variable approach. Similar to Cheng, Ioannou, Serafeim 
(2014), we use the industry level CSR performance as an instrument. As expected, we show that 
corporate social performance is highly correlated with the average CSR ratings of the industry. In 
the second stage regression, we continue to find a significant positive correlation between the 
instrumented social performance and the likelihood of CEOs securing new executive positions and 
the likelihood of their obtaining executive positions at publicly traded firms. 
Next, we explore the subsample of CEOs who secure new executive positions at publicly 
listed firms, where we are able to collect more detailed information about the new employers. We 
find that CEOs whose former employers have strong social performance are more likely to move 
to companies that are larger than their former employers. To the extent executives at larger public 
firms enjoy more prestige and higher pay, such moves may be regarded as promotions. The results 
are therefore consistent with the managerial labor market rewarding CEOs for superior social 
performance at their previous employers. 
Next, we examine whether social performance plays a role in determining the gap between 
executive employment. Ertimur et al. (2017) find an average gap of about two years between 
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managerial employment and attribute the gap to labor market frictions and managerial skillset. Fee 
and Hadlock (2003) separate executives who jump immediately from a prior public employer to a 
new position from those with employment gaps and find evidence suggesting that the former 
outperform the latter in terms of financial results. Using a Cox proportional hazards model, we 
find that the employment gap is significantly shorter for CEOs leaving firms with strong social 
performance than for those from firms with weak social performance. The results are consistent 
with CEOs with a reputation of committing to social good having more favorable job market 
prospects.  
Finally, we conduct two additional analyses. First, we explore the subsample of CEOs who 
secure new executive positions at publicly listed firms, where we are able to collect more detailed 
information about the new employers. We find that CEOs whose former employers have strong 
social performance are more likely to move to companies that are larger in size than their former 
employers. To the extent executives at larger public firms enjoy more prestige and higher pay, 
such moves may be regarded as promotions. The results are therefore consistent with the 
managerial labor market rewarding CEOs for superior social performance at their previous 
employers. Second, we separately examine voluntary vs. forced CEO turnovers. We find that 
CEOs whose former employers have strong social performance are more likely to find executive 
positions in general and at publicly firms if the CEOs leave their employers voluntarily. In contrast, 
we do not find these results for CEOs who are forced to leave the firm. These results reinforce the 
notion that superior social performance signals managerial ability in the labor market. 
This study makes at least two contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on 
managerial labor market by providing new evidence that potential employers consider corporate 
social performance as an indicator of managerial quality and rewards socially conscious CEOs 
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with favorable career prospects. Our findings add to prior studies where financial performance is 
the primary signal of CEO quality. As the demand of managerial labor market shapes CEO 
behavior, our findings have implications for understanding managerial incentives to engage in 
CSR practices.   
Second, this study adds to the CSR literature by presenting additional evidence consistent 
with CSR engagements being viewed positively by shareholders. The managerial labor market can 
be a disciplinary mechanism that penalizes managerial misconduct in the form of ex-post settling 
up. Prior research finds evidence suggesting that the labor market is effective in terms of punishing 
CEO wrongdoings and differentiating between good and poor managerial performance (Desai, 
Hogan, and Wilkins 2006; Cannella, Fraser, and Lee 1995). Our finding that the labor market 
rewards CEOs’ previous CSR engagement suggests that shareholders’ overall view of CSR 
activities is positive. Previous CSR engagement can be informative about CEOs’ ability to create 
shareholder value via social awareness and about their ethical standards.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the hypothesis 
development. Section 3 describes our sample and descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development  
Fama (1980) characterizes managerial labor market as a principal disciplinary and 
incentive mechanism. Analytical research predicts that CEOs’ concerns about labor market 
opportunities affect various managerial decisions including risk-taking, capital structure, and 
investment (e.g., Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa 1986; Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Hirshleifer and 
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Thakor 1992; Holmstrom 1999).1 Empirical evidence on the managerial labor market, however, is 
limited relative to that on other managerial incentive devices such as the market for corporate 
control and executive compensation. 
As managers’ ability is not directly observable, the labor market likely assesses managerial 
talent based on observations of their output. Several empirical studies find evidence suggesting 
that the labor market uses financial performance as an indicator of managerial ability. Gilson (1989) 
and Houston and James (1993) detect severe external labor market consequences for managers 
whose firms become financially distressed. Fee and Hadlock (2003) construct a sample of top 
managers who move to new employers as CEOs and show that superior stock returns of previous 
employers are helpful, especially for managers who jump ship immediately and senior managers, 
who are perceived to be more accountable for the stock performance in original employers. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the managerial labor market impounds refined information 
about previous financial performance when assessing managerial ability. Cannella, Jr., Fraser, and 
Lee (1995) find that managers associated with banks that failed for reasons arguably beyond the 
managers’ control are more likely to regain comparable positions than managers at other failed 
banks, suggesting that the labor market can discriminate between good and bad managerial 
performance. Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) report that managers of firms issuing accounting 
restatements are significantly less likely to be rehired at comparable positions after departure than 
those of firms without restatements.  
While the analytical and empirical literature on managerial labor market has focused on 
financial performance as an indicator of managerial quality, another corporate performance 
                                                            
1 Several studies provide empirical evidence of the impact of career concerns in specialized labor market, such as 
fund managers and analysts (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Graham, 1999; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; 
Hong and Kubik, 2003; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009). 
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metric—social performance—has attracted substantial shareholder attention in recent years. The 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2016) estimates that $22.9 trillion of professionally 
managed assets considers environmental, social and governance factors in portfolio selection and 
management, standing at 26 percent of all professionally managed assets worldwide. There is 
evidence that large institutional investors engage in dialogues with target companies and exercise 
ownership rights at shareholders’ meetings to promote CSR practices, in addition to screening out 
irresponsible companies from their investment portfolios (Dimson, Karakas, and Li 2015). These 
activities suggest that shareholders are attaching an increasing importance to firms’ social 
performance. 
The value of CSR practices to shareholders, however, has been hotly debated; empirical 
evidence is also mixed. The early literature views social responsibility as a “donation” from 
shareholders to stakeholders that reduces profits (e.g., Friedman 1970). Some further argue that 
CSR practices are the outcome of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Cheng, Hong, and Shue 2014; Masulis and Reza 2015). Masulis and Reza 
(2015), for example, find that corporate giving is positively associated with CEO charity 
preferences and negatively correlated with CEO shareholdings and corporate governance.  
In contrast, other theories hold a positive view of CSR, arguing that CSR practices allow 
management to take a long-term perspective and maximize intertemporal profits, and that CSR 
activities can be an efficient form of delegated philanthropy on behalf of firms’ stakeholders 
including shareholders (Benabou and Tirole 2010). A number of recent studies find evidence 
suggesting that CSR engagement can increase firm value by enhancing customer loyalty and 
product differentiation (Besley and Ghatak 2007; Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen 2014; 
Servaes and Tamayo 2013), improving employee morale and facilitating talent retention (Edmans 
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2012; Turban and Greening 1997), and attracting a broad clientele (Grossman and Sharpe 1986; 
Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 2015). Consistent with CSR activities 
increasing shareholder wealth, Dimson Karakas and Li (2015) show that target companies 
experience positive abnormal returns following successful CSR engagements initiated by large 
institutional investors.  
If managers engage in CSR activities that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders, 
we expect the labor market to discipline the managers through the ex-post settling up. That is, the 
labor market is likely to punish the CEOs by cutting their job market opportunities. However, if 
CSR activities create shareholder value while achieving social benefits, we expect the managerial 
labor market to reward CSR conscious CEOs with favorable career prospects. Strong corporate 
social performance can convey positive information about CEO quality in at least two ways. First, 
CEOs of CSR firms may be perceived as having the expertise to create shareholder wealth while 
balancing the needs of other stakeholders. With various stakeholders, including regulators, paying 
increasing attention to CSR activities, such expertise can be in high demand as a growing number 
of potential employers aim to achieve a balance between CSR and value maximization to reduce 
external pressure. Second, CSR activities are often associated with an image of integrity, which 
can reflect on personal qualities of CEOs who champion these activities. Benabou and Tirole (2006) 
argue that variations in prosocial behavior are partly driven by heterogeneity in agents’ individual 
degrees of altruism and greed. Strong corporate social performance can thus be attributed to 
managerial altruism and help CEOs build a reputation of integrity. It is conceivable that individuals 
with high ethical standards and integrity are more likely to fulfill their fiduciary duty and less likely 
to expropriate shareholders to extract personal benefits. Potential employers may, therefore, 
consider executives of integrity to be valuable assets. Consistent with this argument, a Harvard 
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Business Review survey reveals that integrity is one of the seven skills sought after in the C-suite 
(Groysberg 2014). This suggests that the labor market will reward socially conscious CEOs with 
better career prospects. 
Given the contrasting predictions regarding social performance and signaling of 
management ability, we form the hypothesis in its null form: 
 
H1: Social performance of the departing CEO’s previous employer is unrelated to the CEO’s 
future employment prospects. 
   
3. Data description and univariate analysis 
We start the sample by identifying CEO departures in U.S. public firms using information 
on both the Execucomp and BoardEx.  Specifically, we flag potential turnovers when the 
identifications of CEO between two consecutive years differ. The last year that a CEO is with the 
previous employer is considered the turnover year. We restrict the sample to departing CEOs 
younger than 60 in their turnover year to exclude retirements.  
For every departing CEO, we verify the accuracy of the employment data available in 
Execucomp and BoardEx and manually collect additional information about the CEO’s 
employment at the firm he/she is leaving (labeled as the previous employer hereafter) and the firm 
he/she is joining (labeled as the subsequent employer hereafter). Information regarding the CEO’s 
employment at the previous employer includes the date he/she becomes the CEO, the year he/she 
steps down from the CEO position, and any positions in the same firm after he/she steps down.  
For the CEO’s subsequent employer, we gather information on the subsequent employer’s name, 
the year he/she starts the new job, and the new job title. As future employment information is often 
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missing in Exceucomp and BoardEx, we employ extensive manual collection using Google search, 
followed by Bloomberg and Linked-in searches for the subsequent positions of departing CEOs.  
 During the data collection process, we apply several filters to ensure that we have a clean 
sample of CEO turnovers where the departing CEOs were actively searching for a job: (1) we 
eliminate all cases where the CEO steps down and takes another position in the same company, 
often as the Chairman of the board; (2) we eliminate all CEO turnovers that are associated with 
mergers and spin-offs; (3) we remove all CEO change cases if the change is due to death or CEO 
health issues, and (4) we remove cases if CEOs find a job more than 15 years after their departure. 
To ensure the departing CEO has some impact on the CSR performance of the firm, we also 
identify and exclude turnovers of interim CEOs, that is, if the CEO tenure is less than a year. In 
the end, our data collection procedures result in a sample of 1,915 CEO turnover cases, spanning 
from 1993 to 2012.  
We focus on turnovers of CEOs as opposed to executives that are in non-CEO positions 
for the following reasons. First, CEOs are likely to have more control over firms’ CSR policies 
than other executives. Second, CEOs are likely to be in the spotlight to discuss their firms’ CSR 
performance and get more credit for such efforts. It is therefore likely that potential employers 
attribute firms’ CSR practices to their CEOs. We believe that the focus on CEOs provides a more 
powerful setting to test the relation between corporate social performance and managerial labor 
market prospects.   
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 presents the sample distributions. Panel A reports the distribution of CEO turnovers 
by year. We have fewer CEO turnover cases in the 1990s, potentially due to the limited coverage 
of Execucomp and BoardEx. The highest frequency appears in 2007, which can be related to the 
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financial crisis. The second highest frequency appears in 2005. Anecdotes suggest that it may be 
related to the global governance reform.2 Panel B of Table 1 reports the industry distribution of 
the CEO turnover sample. The three industries with the most turnover cases are business 
equipment, finance, and healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs. Departing CEOs’ age 
distribution is presented in Panel C. While there are 74 departing CEOs under age 40, the majority 
CEOs are over 50 years old. Panel D of Table 1 summarizes the types of CEOs’ subsequent 
employers. The majority of these executives take new executive positions in private firms (944 out 
of 1915), followed by executive positions in public firms (281 out of 1915). Other less frequent 
fields include nonprofit organizations, education, politics and others. In 653 cases, no new 
employment information is available. 
We obtain CSR ratings data from MSCI ESG STATS (previously called KLD) and 
construct an aggregate measure by calculating the total number of strengths minus the total number 
of concerns in the following categories: environment, community affairs, employees, diversity, 
human rights, and products.3 We refer to a firm as a CSR firm, that is, a firm with strong social 
performance, if it has more CSR strengths than CSR weakness in a year. All other firms are non-
CSR firms. We capture (average) CSR performance over different windows: one year, two years 
and three years prior to the turnover.4 If a firm’s CSR ratings are missing in any year, we use the 
CSR ratings for the other years in the relevant measurement window to classify whether a firm is 
CSR conscious or not. Similarly, if a CEO’s tenure is shorter than the horizon of CSR measurement, 
our CSR measure is computed over the tenure of the CEO.  
                                                            
2 http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060518005074/en/Global-CEO-Turnover-Set-New-Record-2005 
3 We exclude the measure of governance as it is a distinct measure, including the disclosure of a firm’s CSR efforts 
etc.  
4 We also followed Servaes and Tamayo (2013) and use the maximum number of strengths and concerns in each 
category to adjust the CSR performance for each firm before aggregating the CSR index. Our inferences are 
unchanged.  
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[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of departing CEOs’ previous employers. In panel 
A, we report the percent of CSR conscious firms (i.e., CSR firms) measured over the most recent 
one, two and three years. Regardless of the horizon over which we measure CSR performance, 
about 30% of firms are classified as CSR firms. The average sample firms are large and non-
profitable with negative ROA and return. The mean market value of equity is $2.2 billion. The 
departing CEOs are on average 47 years of old, with an average tenure of 6.4 years. About 2% of 
the sample firms announced restatement of financial reports.  
 In Panel B, we partition the sample by whether the previous employer is CSR conscious, 
determined based on its CSR performance of the most recent year before CEO departure, and 
compare the characteristics of the two resulting subsamples. Consistent with the literature, CSR 
firms are significantly larger and have better performance as measured by ROA (both with p-
values less than 1%). There is no significant difference between the two groups of firms regarding 
return, executive tenure, or the likelihood of restatement.  
 We also report executives’ future employment outcome for the two subsamples partitioned 
by whether the previous employer is CSR conscious. Of the 295 CEOs leaving CSR firms, 96 do 
not have a future executive job (32.5%), five percent lower than that of CEOs leaving non-CSR 
firms (37.8%), and the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. Further, CEOs leaving 
CSR firms are more likely than CEOs leaving non-CSR firms to find a new executive position at 
a public firm (19.7% and 13.8% for CSR firms and non-CSR firms). The difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.5  
 
                                                            
5 The comparison partitioned by CSR performance measured over the most recent two and three years are similar and 
not tabulated.     
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4. Research Design and Empirical analysis 
4.1 CSR and favorable labor market outcome 
We construct the following regression model to test the relation between CSR performance 
and labor market prospects.   
Labor Market Outcome = α0 + β1CSRFIRMt + β2Log(SIZEt) + β3ROAt + β4RETt + β5Log(AGE)  
            +β6Log(TENURE) + β7RESTATE + Year FE + Industry FE + εi,t                                                   (1) 
The dependent variable captures whether departing CEOs receive favorable labor market 
outcomes. We use various measures to focus on different aspects of labor market outcomes. First, 
we define finding a new executive position (relative to not finding an executive position) as a 
favorable outcome, including getting another executive position at either a public firm or a private 
firm. If the departing CEOs take fulltime positions in institutions like non-profit organizations or 
universities, we also consider the case as the CEOs landing new jobs.  
Second, as public firms are on average more visible and their executives are paid higher 
than private firms or other organizations,6 we next focus on whether departing CEOs could land 
an executive position in a public firm as the labor market outcome. Third, within the subsample of 
departing CEOs finding new executives positions in public firms, we examine whether CSR 
performance of the prior employer helps departing CEOs to obtain an executive position at a larger 
public firm than their previous employers.  
We include a number of control variables following the prior literature. Fee and Hadlock 
(2003) show that firm size is positively associated with executives finding another executive 
position in a publicly-traded firm. This suggests that executives of larger firms are considered more 
desirable in the labor market, either due to these positions being signals of managerial quality or 
                                                            
6 https://chiefexecutive.net/widening-gap-public-private-company-ceo-pay__trashed/ 
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providing more opportunities to develop managerial expertise. They also show that superior stock 
market performance in the prior employer helps executives jump to CEO positions at new 
employers. Further, Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) use industry-adjusted ROA as a measure 
of CEO talent. We include both industry-adjusted stock returns and ROA as control variables for 
predicting labor market prospect. We also follow Fee and Hadlock (2003) and control for the age 
and tenure of departing CEOs, both of which have been shown to negatively impact the labor 
market prospect.  Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) show that employment prospects of displaced 
executives (including chairman, CEO and president) are worse following a restatement. Whether 
a firm announces restatement (RESTATE) is included to account for potential different career 
outcome driven by accounting restatement. To capture the effects of year and industry on the labor 
market outcomes, we include both year and industry fixed effects in our regression model. To 
avoid the incidental parameter problem, we follow Kim, Shroff, Vyas, and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2018) and estimate the regression as a linear probability model.7 
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of model (1). Standard errors are robust to 
accounting for potential heterogeneity. When CSR performance is measured over the most recent 
year, we observe that CSR FIRM has a positive and significant effect on the probability of CEOs 
finding a new job (0.0711, p-value<2%). This suggests CEOs leaving an employer with strong 
CSR performance in the year prior to departure are 7.11% more likely to find a new job than those 
leaving employers with weak CSR performance. When the CSR performance of the previous 
                                                            
7 As pointed out in Kim et al. (2017), Greene’s (2004) criticize the inclusion of fixed effects in non-linear models as 
it has two shortcomings. The first is a practical obstacle regarding the difficulty of computing the MLE of the 
coefficients of non-linear models with a large number of dummy variable coefficients; the second is incidental 
parameters problem that cast doubt on the statistical properties of the ML estimator. Therefore, we do not estimate 
model (1) as a non-linear model. However, our findings are robust to estimating a probit or a logit regression. 
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employer is measured over the most recent two and three years, we similarly find a positive and 
significant coefficient on CSR FIRM (0.0833, 0.0721, with p-values<1%). Untabulated results 
using probit and logit models yield similar inferences. The results support our hypothesis that the 
CSR performance of the previous employer helps departing CEOs in the job search.   
Consistent with industry-adjusted ROA being a proxy for the talent of improving firm 
performance, leaving a firm with superior financial performance increases the probability of 
executives finding the next job. Other variables with a significant influence in job search include 
the age and tenure of the departing CEO; older CEOs and those with longer tenure are less likely 
to find a new job. The size of the previous employer, market return, and the incidence of 
restatement are not significantly correlated with CEOs’ career outcome.  
Next, we examine whether the CSR performance of the previous employer affects the 
likelihood of departing CEOs becoming executives in another public firm and report the results in 
Table 4. The coefficient on CSR FIRM is positive and significant for all measuring horizons of 
CSR performance. This is consistent with the univariate analysis, suggesting that the CSR 
performance of the previous employers increases the likelihood of departing CEOs becoming 
executives in other public firms. Similar to the results in Table 3, departing CEO who are older 
and those with longer tenure are less likely to find a position in a public firm. Unlike in the results 
in Table 3, the financial performance of the previous firm does not seem to significantly improve 
CEOs’ chance of being rehired as executives in other public firms. Together with the inference 
from Table 3, the results provide support for our prediction that departing executives benefit when 
their previous employer outperform in CSR. 
[Insert Table 4] 
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4.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform a series of robustness checks and report the results in Table 5. 
First, we use a continuous measure of CSR performance, that is, the total number of strengths 
minus the number of concerns (CSR SCORE), in place of the dummy variable used in Tables 3 
and 4. As shown in the first three columns in Panel A, the coefficient on CSR SCORE is positive 
and significantly associated with the probability of finding a new job, consistent with the inference 
from Table 3. Also similar to Table 4, we get positive and significant coefficients on CSR SCORE 
from Columns (4) through (6) when the career outcome is measured as the likelihood of securing 
a new executive job at a public firm. 
[Insert Table 5] 
In panel B, we use an alternative measure of CSR performance following Servaes and 
Tamayo (2013), who adjust the number of strengths and concerns by the maximum possible 
number within each CSR category. We obtain similar results using both the continuous and the 
dummy variable version of the variable (Adj. CSR FIRM) and only report the latter in Panel B for 
brevity. As in Tables 3 and 4, executives from CSR firms as identified by Adj. CSR FIRM are more 
likely to find a new job and find an executive position in a public firm.  
In Panel C, we also extend the horizon over which CSR performance is measured to five 
years prior to turnover and the entire tenure of the departing CEO. As these two measuring 
horizons are longer than what we have used, CEOs’ earlier CSR performance is also taken into 
consideration. The coefficient on the dummy variable CSR FIRM is positive and significant for all 
four columns, suggesting that leaving a CSR conscious employer increases the probability of 
finding the next job or the next executive position in a public firm by 5-6%, when CSR 
performance is measured over the most recent five years, or the entire duration of CEO tenure. 
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One issue in using a linear probability model is that the predicted probability may not be a 
value between zero and one. Although we obtain similar results if logit or probit regressions are 
used, the results are subject to the incidental parameters problem as we have both industry and 
year fixed effects. In Panel D, we report the results from estimating a conditional logit regression. 
Consistent with our earlier results, the coefficient on CSR FIRM is positive and significant at the 
1% level across different horizons of measuring CSR performance of the previous employer and 
for both the probability of finding the new job or finding an executive position in a public firm, 
lending additional support for the robustness of our earlier results.  
Although we have controlled for managerial ability as reflected in ROA and stock returns, 
it is still possible that the career path of the departing CEOs depends on certain skills they have 
acquired over time. In the event that such skills are not captured by financial or stock performance 
and valued by future employers, it is an omitted variable, which is a problem if it correlates with 
the CSR performance of the previous employer. We thus control for general managerial ability 
using Custodio et al.’s (2013) measure which captures executives’ accumulated managerial ability 
based on their work experience that is transferable to other firms or industries (GENERAL 
ABILITY).8 Panel E of Table 5 reports the regression results after controlling for GENERAL 
ABILITY. Similar to the results in Tables 3 and 4, the coefficient estimates on CSR FIRM remain 
mostly positive and significant. GENERAL ABILITY is significantly positively correlated with the 
probability of finding a new job and the probability of finding an executive position in a public 
firm, consistent with the notion that CEOs with more general ability are more likely to find jobs 
when they leave their current position. Results in this table indicate that CSR performance cannot 
                                                            
8  They extract the first factor from a principal component analysis that includes five proxies for executives’ 
professional skills: past number of positions, number of firms, number of industries, whether the CEO held an 
executive position at a different company, and whether the CEO worked for a conglomerate. 
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be subsumed by managers’ general ability and is an important determinant of executives’ job 
market outcomes.  
 
4.3 Endogeneity of CSR Performance 
Although the results in the previous sections support the conjecture that being CSR-
conscious improves CEOs’ labor market prospects, one concern about the results is the issue of 
endogeneity. Firms’ CSR performance can be correlated with some relevant but unobservable 
omitted variables, which also affect executives’ job market opportunities. To address the potential 
endogeneity issue, we employ the instrumental variables approach to test our prediction. 
We use the average CSR performance of peer firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry 
(Industry CSR) as an instrumental variable for the CSR performance of CEOs’ previous 
employers.9 Conceptually, the industry average CSR performance should correlate with firm-level 
CSR performance. However, industry CSR performance should not affect a particular executive’s 
job market outcomes directly, unless it is through the CSR performance of the previous employer.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the first stage regression, which regresses CSR FIRM on 
Industry CSR and all the control variables. We observe that the coefficient estimates for Industry 
CSR are all positive and highly significant across all measuring horizons for CSR FIRM, which 
suggest the relevance condition is satisfied. The first-stage F-statistics for the test that the 
instrument can be excluded from the first-stage regression are all above ten, alleviating concerns 
for weak instrument. Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of the second stage regressions. The 
first three columns present the results with finding a new job as the favorable labor market outcome 
                                                            
9 We also consider religion rank and blue state as instrumental variable candidates. However, they appear to be weak 
instruments for our sample in the first stage analysis. 
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and the last three columns presents the results with finding a job in a public firm as the favorable 
labor market outcome. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3 and 4, the coefficient 
estimates on CSR FIRM are all positive and significant, suggesting that being CSR-conscious 
enhances executives’ position in the labor market.  
 
4.4 CSR and the duration of job search  
The focus of the previous section is on whether social performance of the previous 
employer helps increase the likelihood of executives finding a new job. We next employ a duration 
analysis, which can address the concern of biased estimates in the presence of censored data. The 
data on future employment of executives are right censored, because we end the search of news 
for their new jobs as of December 2016, and therefore could not observe what happens after that. 
We employ both a non-parametric and a semi-parametric method to examine the effect of CSR 
performance on the occurrence and the speed for CEOs to find another executive position. 
4.4.1 Using a Non-parametric method 
We first use the Kaplan-Meier estimator, a non-parametric approach, to estimate the 
survivor function in the presence of right censoring. In particular, the Kaplan-Meier estimator for 
the survivor function is 
𝑆መሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ ෑ ൬𝑛௜ െ 𝑑௜ 𝑛௜ ൰௜:௧೔ஸ௧
, 
where 𝑑௜ is the number of executives finding a job and 𝑛௜ the number of executives at risk (i.e., 
those who have not found a job or have not been censored) at time 𝑡௜. 
As the influence of social performance of the previous employers is likely the strongest 
immediately after turnover, we focus on estimating the survivor function during the first five years 
after turnover. As the gap between employment is measured using years, and some executives find 
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a new job in the same year of turnover. To ensure that the survival time is positive, we add one 
year to the actual duration of employment. In particular, when CEOs find another executive 
position in the same year of leaving the previous employer, the time to event is defined as one year 
(i.e., t=1). Similarly, an executive who found a new job five years after turnover is considered to 
have found a job by year six (i.e., t=6). 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 1 Panel A presents two survival curves for executives from CSR firms and those 
from non-CSR firms. Since an event of finding a job is similar to death in traditional survival 
analysis, a higher survival rate at time t  means it takes longer for executives to find a job. The 
function of CSR executives is noticeable below that of non-CSR executives, indicating that the 
duration of unemployment is shorter for CSR executives. In particular, the risk of not finding the 
next executive position, in the same year of turnover is 92% for CSR firms, about 4% lower than 
that for non-CSR firms. The largest difference in the survival rate is observed at t=2, (i.e., the risk 
of not finding an executive position by the end of the first year after turnover)—it is 62% for CSR 
firms, about 10% lower than that for non-CSR firms. 
[Insert Table 7] 
We next test for the equality of survivor functions between CSR firms and non-CSR firms 
in Panel A. Using both the log-rank test and the Wilcoxon test, we reject the null hypothesis that 
the two survivor functions are equal (p-value = 0.047 and 0.013, respectively). Taken together 
with the visual comparison in Panel A, the results suggest that there is significant difference in the 
survivor functions between CSR firms and non-CSR firms.  
In Panel B, we compare the survivor functions for CSR firms and non-CSR firms when an 
event is defined as finding an executive position in a public firm. Similar to the pattern in Panel A, 
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the survival rate at any time t is higher for CEOs from non-CSR firms than CSR firms, which 
suggests that it takes longer for CEOs leaving non-CSR firms than CSR firms to find another 
executive position in a public firm. The results from the log-rank test and Wilcoxon test reject the 
null hypothesis that the survivor functions for CSR and non-CSR firms are equal (p-values = 0.024 
and 0.005 respectively). This lends statistical support to the visual difference between the two 
survivor functions. Although most departing CEOs do not find another executive position in a 
public firm, those leaving a CSR firm have a better chance. For example, at t=2, the survival rate 
for CEOs leaving a CSR firm is 89%, 6% lower than for those leaving a non-CSR firm, which 
suggests that it takes less time for CEOs leaving CSR firms to find an executive position in a public 
firm.  
4.4.2 Using a Semi-parametric model 
Next, we also employ the Cox proportional hazards (PH) model, a semi-parametric method, 
to account for the effect of other covariates affecting the occurrence and the speed of CEOs landing 
the next executive position. We are mainly interested in the coefficient on firms’ CSR performance. 
A positive coefficient means that CEOs leaving firms with strong CSR performance can find 
another executive position faster than those leaving firms with weaker CSR performance.   
In particular, let T be the survival time, i.e., the number of years until a CEO finds another 
executive position. The hazard function at time t is defined as ℎሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ lim୩→଴
௉௥ሾ௧ା௞வ்ஹ௧|்ஹ௧ሿ
௞ . The Cox 
PH model assumes that the hazard function h(t) take the following expression,  
h(t) = h0(t) exp(Xβ),  
where h0(t) is the baseline hazards function that may be unspecified. The vector for covariates X 
include the same variables as in earlier models, including firm size, ROA, Return, the log of the 
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executives’ age, the log of their tenure, and restatement, all measured as of the last year that the 
executive holds the CEO position in the previous employer.   
 Panel A of Table 7 summarizes the estimation results from the Cox PH model. As in earlier 
tables, we define the indicator variable CSR Firm based on CSR performance over three different 
horizons, i.e., one year, two years and three years before the year of executive turnover. As 
expected, the coefficient on CSR FIRM is positive and significant across all three horizons. The 
hazard ratios reported along with the coefficients suggest that executives leaving CSR firms are 
about 26% to 30% more likely than those leaving non-CSR firms to find the next executive position. 
Similar to earlier regressions, the only two significant covariates are age and tenure—younger 
executives and those with shorter tenure are more likely to find a job.  
 In Panel B, we also report the estimation results from the Cox PH model where an event is 
defined as CEOs finding an executive position in a public firm. Regardless of the horizon over 
which we measure the CSR performance of the previous employer, the coefficient on CSR FIRM 
is positive and statistically significant (0.4375, 0.6035, 0.6233, all with p-values<1%). The 
economic significance of the advantage of CSR executives in labor market is even more significant 
than in that in Panel A—executives from CSR firms are 55%-86% more likely than those from 
non-CSR firms to land an executive position in a public firm.  
 
4.5 Additional analysis 
4.5.1 Moving up to a bigger public firm 
 When we examine the probability of departing CEOs finding a new job, no distinction has 
been made as to the desirability of the next position except for whether it is at a public firm. Given 
the limited information we could gather from private firms in general, we now focus on executives 
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who find an executive position in public firms after leaving their previous employers. Since public 
firms vary in size and working in larger firm is likely associated with prestige and higher 
compensation, we examine whether the CSR performance of the previous employer helps 
departing CEOs move up to work in a larger firm. To carry out the analysis, we restrict the sample 
to executives who subsequently find a job in a public firm, so the firm size of the previous 
employer and the future employer can be compared. A CEO is considered to be moving up if 
he/she lands a CEO position in a public firm that is in a higher firm size decile than his/her previous 
firm. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 Table 8 presents the estimation of the likelihood of moving up to a large public firm. The 
first three columns show a positive and significant coefficient on CSR FIRM, which means that 
leaving a strong CSR-performing firm improves the chance of finding a CEO position in a larger 
firm. The difference in probability ranges from 19-22%, and is likely economically significant. 
When we include the GENERAL ABILITY to control for managerial skills, which cuts the sample 
size further by more than 50%. The effect of CSR FIRM on the likelihood of moving up remains 
positive and significant, ranging from 18-34%. These results provide further support for our earlier 
results.  
 
4.5.2 Voluntary versus Forced Turnovers 
CEO turnovers can happen in very different circumstances. Some are forced turnovers due 
to unsatisfactory performance of various types, while others are voluntary turnovers. To gauge 
whether being CSR-conscious affects CEOs’ job market outcomes differently for different types 
of turnovers, we merge our sample with the CEO turnover dataset developed by Jenter and Kanaan 
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(2015), who categorize CEO turnovers into forced turnovers and voluntary turnovers. The 
requirement of non-missing data for the type of turnover reduces our sample by approximately 
50%. After identifying a voluntary turnover subsample and a forced turnover subsample, we rerun 
our analyses in these two subsamples separately.10 
[Insert Table 9]  
Panel A and panel B of Table 9 present results for the voluntary turnover subsample and 
the forced turnover subsample, respectively. CSR FIRM exhibits positive and significant relations 
with both favorable job market outcomes for the sample of voluntarily departing CEOs, despite 
the small sample size. In particular, leaving a CSR firm increases the chance of landing the next 
job or finding an executive position in a public firm by 10-12%, and 8-10% respectively. On the 
other hand, when CEOs are forced to leave the firm, the coefficient estimates on CSR FIRM 
become insignificant across all specifications. This suggests that forced turnover is a signal of poor 
managerial skills, which is more important in shaping executives’ future career path than the CSR 
performance of the previous employer.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Prior research suggests that potential employers use corporate financial performance as a 
signal of managerial ability when assessing external executive hires (Gilson, 1989; Houston and 
James, 1993; Cannella, Jr., Fraser, and Lee 1995; Fee and Hadlock 2003; Desai, Hogan, and 
Wilkins 2006). Recently, various stakeholders, including shareholders, have been increasingly 
                                                            
10 It is worth noting that even though Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and this paper both studies CEO turnovers, our 
samples are rather different due to different research questions. While Jenter and Kanaan (2015) focus on the 
turnover itself, we study the future career outcomes, thus requiring the turnover CEO actually leave the original 
firm. Also, we do not include any departing CEO that is at or above 60 years old, which Jenter and Kanaan (2015) 
categorize as voluntary. In addition, our sample is constructed not only using Execucomp, but also using Boardx.  
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using social performance as a performance metric (e.g., Dimson, Karakaş, and Li 2015). We 
examine whether and how the managerial labor market considers a firm’s social performance in 
assessing managerial quality.  
We examine the empirical question of whether a firm’s social performance is related to the 
CEO’s future job market opportunities by compiling a sample of CEO changes and manually 
collecting information about departing CEOs’ subsequent employment records. We measure a 
firm’s social performance with a summary CSR score that reflects various aspects of social 
responsibility using the social ratings data issued by MSCI. We find that CEOs leaving firms with 
strong social performance are more likely to secure new executive positions, after controlling for 
the size and financial performance of their previous employers and CEO characteristics such as 
age and tenure. We also find that CEOs leaving firms with strong CSR performance are more 
likely to be hired as executives by public firms. These results suggest that the managerial labor 
market rewards CEOs for their social performance. Our inference is robust to a number of 
alternative specifications, including measuring corporate social performance over different 
windows before CEO departures, using a conditional logit regression model, and controlling for 
general managerial ability. Our inference is also robust to using an instrumental variable approach 
to address the concern for endogeneity of CSR performance. Using a hazard model, we find that 
the employment gap is significantly shorter for CEOs leaving firms with strong social performance 
than for those from firms with weak social performance.  
Focusing on the subsample of CEOs who secure new executive positions at publicly listed 
firms, we find that CEOs whose former employers have strong social performance are more likely 
to move to companies that are larger in size than their former employers. We also find that superior 
social performance rewards CEOs voluntarily leaving their previous employers but not CEOs who 
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are forced to leave. Collectively, the results suggest that CEOs with a reputation of committing to 
social good have more favorable job market prospects. We contribute to the literature on 
managerial labor market by providing new evidence that potential employers consider corporate 
social performance, in addition to financial performance, as an indicator of managerial quality.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Job Market Consequences 
New job A dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job after 
turnover, and zero otherwise. 
Public job A dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job in a public 
firm after turnover, and zero otherwise. 
Move up A dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a CEO position at 
a firm that is in a higher total asset decile, and zero otherwise.   
CSR Related Variables 
CSR score The difference between the number of strengths and concerns 
measured over a period, such as one year, two years or three years 
prior to last year of turnover.    
CSR FIRM A dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score (i.e., the 
difference between the number of strengths and concerns measured 
over a period) is positive, and zero otherwise. 
Adj. CSR FIRM A dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s adjusted CSR score is 
positive, and zero otherwise. Following Servaes and Tamayo (2013), 
we deflate the number of strengths or concerns by the maximum 
possible number of strengths or concerns in a CSR category for each 
firm-year.  
IndCSR Average CSR score of other firms in the same industry at the year of 
a CEO's turnover.    
Other Control Variables 
SIZE The market capitalization of the previous employer. 
ROA Average industry adjusted ROA over a particular measuring horizon. 
RET Average industry adjusted return over a particular measuring horizon.  
AGE CEO's age as turnover year in the previous employer 
TENURE CEO's tenure length in the previous employer as of turnover year 
RESTATE A dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure in the 
previous employer. 
GENERAL ABILITY General ability index, the first factor extracted from a principal 
components analysis to five proxies of general managerial ability: 
past number of positions, number of firms, number of industries, CEO 
experience dummy, and conglomerate experience dummy 
(BoardEx).  
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Figure 1. The length of time before getting a positive job market outcome  
This figures describes the duration of unemployment before a positive job market outcome for executives 
leaving the previous company. Positive outcomes include finding an executive position, and finding an 
executive position in a public company within 5 years after turnover. We use CSR score measured over the 
previous year (i.e., CSR horizon=1 year) to classify whether a firm is CSR concious or not. The graphs for 
other horizons are similar but untabulated.  
Panel A. Duration of unemployment 
 
 
Panel B. Duration before finding an executive position in a public firm. 
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Table 1 
Executive Turnover Sample Distribution 
 
This table presents the sample distributions. Panel A reports the distribution of CEO turnovers by year. 
Panel B reports the industry distribution of CEO turnovers sample. Panel C presents departing CEOs’ age 
distribution. Panel D summarizes the categories of departing CEOs’ new jobs. 
 
Panel A Sample Distribution by Turnover Year 
Turnover Year Frequency Percent 
1993 3 0.16 
1994 19 0.99 
1995 23 1.2 
1996 28 1.46 
1997 26 1.36 
1998 32 1.67 
1999 35 1.83 
2000 52 2.72 
2001 81 4.23 
2002 90 4.7 
2003 131 6.84 
2004 169 8.83 
2005 197 10.29 
2006 186 9.71 
2007 227 11.85 
2008 163 8.51 
2009 126 6.58 
2010 145 7.57 
2011 139 7.26 
2012 43 2.25 
Total 1915 100 
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Panel B Sample Distribution by Industry 
FF12 Industry Frequency Percent 
1 Consumer NonDurable 88 4.6 
2 Consumer Durables 40 2.09 
3 Manufacturing 145 7.57 
4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 60 3.13 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 32 1.67 
6 Business Equipment 467 24.39 
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 38 1.98 
8 Utilities 48 2.51 
9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 208 10.86 
10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 272 14.2 
11 Finance 281 14.67 
12 Other 236 12.32 
 Total  1915 100 
 
 
Panel C Executive Age Distribution at Turnover 
AGE at Turnover Frequency Percent 
35<=AGE<=39 74 3.86 
40<=AGE<=44 202 10.55 
45<=AGE<=49 377 19.69 
50<=AGE<=54 626 32.69 
55<=AGE<=59 636 33.21 
Total 1915 100.00 
 
 
Panel D Distribution of New Firm Types 
New Firm Type Frequency Percent 
Public 281 14.67 
Private 944 49.30 
Nonprofit 20 1.04 
Others 17 0.88 
No New Job 653 34.10 
Total 1915 100 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the sample with CEO turnover. In panel A, we summarize the 
explanatory variables used in our analysis, all of which are the characteristics of the previous employer. 
Panel B compares the characteristics of the previous employer for departing CEOs, partitioned by whether 
a firm is a CSR conscious firm or not, using its CSR performance based on the most recent year. Panel C 
exhibits executives’ subsequent employment categories by most recent year’s CSR performance. CSR 
FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score is positive over the one year, two years, 
and three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA is the average industry adjusted 
ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted return over the measuring window. 
AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. TENURE is the CEO’s tenure length as the original firms’ CEO. 
RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure. 
 
Panel A. Characteristics of the Previous Employer 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
CSR FIRM        
    CSR Horizon=1 year 1006 0.2932 0.4555 0 0 1 
    CSR Horizon-2 years 1113 0.2938 0.4557 0 0 1 
    CSR Horizon=3 years 1139 0.2994 0.4582 0 0 1 
SIZE 1900 2892.32 11540.42 92.0798 336.0023 1350.06 
ROA 1898 -0.0985 0.3051 -0.1367 0.0014 0.0471 
RET 1797 -0.0068 0.0512 -0.0334 -0.0030 0.0210 
AGE 1915 51.1128 5.6225 47 52 56 
TENURE 1915 6.3666 4.2380 3 5 8 
RESTATE 1915 0.0240 0.1532 0 0 0 
 
 
Panel B. Characteristics of the Previous Employer, Partitioned by Whether a Firm Is a CSR FIRM 
in the Year Prior to Turnover (CSR horizon = 1 year) 
  Non CSR FIRMs   CSR FIRMs       
Variable N Mean Std Dev  N Mean Std Dev  Difference Pr > |t| 
SIZE 711 2762.97 10445.87  295 10047.60 22605.51  7284.63 <.0001 
ROA 709 -0.0481 0.2499  295 -0.0093 0.1771  0.0388 0.0055 
RET 689 -0.0032 0.0484  284 -0.0039 0.0449  -0.0007 0.8302 
AGE 711 51.6399 5.4284  295 52.5322 4.5399  0.8923 0.0077 
TENURE 711 6.5781 4.3604  295 6.4678 3.8009  -0.1103 0.6888 
RESTATE 711 0.0225 0.1484   295 0.0339 0.1813   0.0114 0.3401 
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Panel C. Distribution of New Firm Types by CSR Performance in the Year Prior to Turnover (i.e., 
CSR horizon = 1 year) 
  CSR performance of the previous employer 
New Firm Type CSR FIRMs Non-CSR FIRMs Total 
Public 58 98 156 
Private 135 331 466 
Nonprofit 2 8 10 
Others 4 5 9 
No New Job 96 269 365 
Total 295 711 1006 
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Table 3 
Probability of Finding a Job 
 
This table tests the relationship between CSR performance and a favorable job market outcome—finding 
a new job. Specifically, we run the following regression: 
New job = α0 + β1CSRFIRMt + β2log(SIZE) + β3ROA + β4RET + β5log(AGE) + β6log(TENURE) 
+ β7RESTATE + Year FE + Industry FE + εi,t 
where New job is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job after turnover, and zero 
otherwise. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score is positive over the one 
year, two years, or three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA is the average 
industry adjusted ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted return over the 
measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. TENURE is the CEO’s tenure length as the original 
firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are estimated and clustered at the industry level. Industry and year fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
CSR Horizon  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.0711** 0.0833*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0249) (0.0178) 
Log(SIZE) -0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0025 
(0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0057) 
ROA 0.0038** 0.0044** 0.0064** 
 (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0026) 
RET 0.1423 0.5257 0.4377 
 (0.3541) (0.4867) (0.4771) 
Log(AGE) -1.2852*** -1.2830*** -1.2843*** 
 (0.1424) (0.1257) (0.1205) 
Log(TENURE) -0.0750*** -0.0779*** -0.0770*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0210) (0.0215) 
RESTATE -0.0010 -0.0129 -0.0202 
 (0.0557) (0.0523) (0.0565) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
    
Adjusted R2 0.1567 0.1582 0.1598 
N 972 1072 1093 
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Table 4 
Probability of finding a job in a public firm 
 
This table tests the relationship between CSR performance and a favorable job market outcome—finding 
an executive position in a public firm. Specifically, we run the following regression: 
Public job = α0 + β1CSRFIRMt + β2log(SIZE) + β3ROA + β4RET + β5log(AGE) + β6log(TENURE) 
+ β7RESTATE + Year FE + Industry FE + εi,t 
where Public job is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job in a public firm after 
turnover, and zero otherwise. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score is 
positive over the one year, two years, or three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. 
ROA is the average industry adjusted ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry 
adjusted return over the measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. TENURE is the CEO’s 
tenure length as the original firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s 
tenure. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are estimated and clustered at the industry level. Industry 
and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.0417** 0.0624*** 0.0669*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0175) (0.0150) 
Log(SIZE) -0.0031 -0.0066 -0.0048 
(0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0067) 
ROA -0.0003 -0.0019 -0.0015 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
RET 0.3947 0.5171 0.2561 
 (0.2999) (0.3721) (0.2199) 
Log(AGE) -0.1755* -0.1864** -0.1802* 
 (0.0884) (0.0802) (0.0849) 
Log(TENURE) -0.0627** -0.0677*** -0.0668*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0164) (0.0171) 
RESTATE 0.1013 0.0834 0.0824 
 (0.0892) (0.0838) (0.0848) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
    
Adjusted R2 0.0256 0.0287 0.0282 
N 972 1072 1093 
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Table 5 
Robustness Checks 
 
This table presents robustness tests for results found in table 3 and table 4. Panel A and panel B reports robustness checks using CSR Score and Adj. 
CSR FIRM as alternative measures for CSR FIRM, respectively. Panel C presents tests using five years and the whole tenure period as alternative 
measuring horizons of CSR FIRM, ROA, and RET. Panel D reports results using a conditional logit regression method. Panel E reports the regression 
results controlling for general managerial ability. CSR Score is the difference between the number of strengths and concerns measured over the one 
year, two years, or three years measuring window. Adj. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s adjusted CSR score is positive 
over the one year, two years or three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA is the average industry adjusted ROA over 
the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted return over the measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. TENURE is the 
CEO’s tenure length as the original firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure. GENERAL ABILITY is 
the general managerial ability index in Custodio et al. (2013). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are estimated and clustered at the industry 
level. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A. Using CSR Score as an alternative measure for CSR Performance 
Dependent variable Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizons 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 [SE] [SE] [SE]  [SE] [SE] [SE] 
CSR Score 0.0169** 0.0152** 0.0143***  0.0132*** 0.0152*** 0.0164*** 
 [0.0070] [0.0058] [0.0051]  [0.0039] [0.0033] [0.0034] 
Log(SIZE) -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0022  -0.0066 -0.0083 -0.0059 
 [0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0058]  [0.0079] [0.0076] [0.0064] 
ROA 0.0037** 0.0041** 0.0062**  -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0017 
 [0.0015] [0.0018] [0.0024]  [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0020] 
RET 0.1659 0.5314 0.4451  0.4192 0.5488 0.2837 
 [0.3500] [0.4595] [0.4595]  [0.2931] [0.3793] [0.2401] 
Log(AGE) -1.2857*** -1.2808*** -1.2848***  -0.1794* -0.1888** -0.1838* 
 [0.1463] [0.1247] [0.1204]  [0.0856] [0.0793] [0.0843] 
Log(TENURE) -0.0754*** -0.0781*** -0.0757***  -0.0630** -0.0677*** -0.0656*** 
 [0.0204] [0.0215] [0.0218]  [0.0208] [0.0167] [0.0171] 
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RESTATE -0.0013 -0.0134 -0.0166  0.0999 0.0826 0.0853 
 [0.0541] [0.0532] [0.0576]  [0.0872] [0.0807] [0.0822] 
Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.1573 0.1559 0.1582  0.0283 0.0290 0.0277 
N 972 1072 1093   972 1072 1093 
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Panel B. Using Adj. CSR FIRM as an alternative measure for CSR performance 
 
Dependent variable Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 [SE] [SE] [SE]  [SE] [SE] [SE] 
Adj. CSR FIRM 0.0790*** 0.0861*** 0.0793***  0.0529** 0.0593*** 0.0619*** 
 [0.0289] [0.0287] [0.0251]  [0.0182] [0.0175] [0.0196] 
Log(SIZE) -0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0014  -0.0033 -0.0052 -0.0031 
 [0.0050] [0.0051] [0.0050]  [0.0078] [0.0070] [0.0061] 
ROA 0.0038** 0.0042** 0.0062**  -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0016 
 [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0026]  [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0019] 
RET 0.1322 0.4794 0.3804  0.3907 0.4788 0.1988 
 [0.3547] [0.4822] [0.4768]  [0.2959] [0.3652] [0.2216] 
Log(AGE) -1.2857*** -1.2814*** -1.2841*** -0.1774* -0.1842** -0.1780* 
[0.1418] [0.1261] [0.1223] [0.0884] [0.0829] [0.0862] 
Log(TENURE) -0.0758*** -0.0787*** -0.0761***  -0.0633** -0.0683*** -0.0660*** 
 [0.0196] [0.0207] [0.0216]  [0.0206] [0.0163] [0.0170] 
RESTATE 0.0047 -0.0104 -0.0167  0.1046 0.0852 0.0859 
 [0.0562] [0.0539] [0.0572]  [0.0885] [0.0826] [0.0830] 
Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.1575 0.1582 0.1604  0.0271 0.0278 0.0268 
N 972 1072 1093   972 1072 1093 
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Panel C.  Alternative measuring horizons for CSR 
Dependent variable Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 5 Years Over the Tenure  5 Years Over the Tenure 
 Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE)  (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.0567** 0.0450**  0.0494*** 0.0494*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0172)  (0.0158) (0.0147) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0009 0.0010  -0.0048 -0.0050 
 (0.0050) (0.0055)  (0.0070) (0.0066) 
ROA 0.0101*** 0.0092**  -0.0013 -0.0012 
 (0.0026) (0.0037)  (0.0025) (0.0026) 
RET 0.4301 0.4099  0.1511 0.2069 
 (0.5905) (0.5826)  (0.3363) (0.3570) 
Log(AGE) -1.2817*** -1.2815***  -0.1773* -0.1777* 
 (0.1172) (0.1188)  (0.0894) (0.0874) 
Log(TENURE) -0.0781*** -0.0752***  -0.0648*** -0.0664*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0227)  (0.0149) (0.0149) 
RESTATE -0.0111 -0.0101  0.0827 0.0834 
 (0.0573) (0.0570)  (0.0838) (0.0837) 
Industry FE Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included Included 
      
Adjusted R2 0.1579 0.1553  0.0241 0.0244 
N 1114 1116  1114 1116 
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Panel D. Conditional Logit Regressions 
Dependent variable Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 [SE] [SE] [SE]  [SE] [SE] [SE] 
CSR FIRM 0.4206*** 0.4919*** 0.4518*** 0.3959*** 0.5496*** 0.6075*** 
 [0.1648] [0.1512] [0.1089]  [0.1643] [0.1559] [0.1220] 
Log(SIZE) 0.0384 0.0153 0.0210  0.0227 -0.0019 0.0074 
 [0.0370] [0.0315] [0.0285]  [0.0575] [0.0612] [0.0538] 
ROA 0.0111 0.0145 0.0211  -0.0069 -0.0228* -0.0199 
 [0.0078] [0.0091] [0.0147]  [0.0121] [0.0129] [0.0165] 
RET 0.9982 3.2148 3.2411  3.0600 3.4388 1.6883 
 [1.5070] [2.3629] [2.1784]  [2.5280] [3.3909] [1.8989] 
Log(AGE) -6.8970*** -7.0120*** -7.0854*** -1.6253** -1.7046** -1.6538** 
[1.1232] [0.9828] [0.9595] [0.7974] [0.6778] [0.7184] 
Log(TENURE) -0.3089*** -0.3514*** -0.3567*** -0.5461*** -0.6199*** -0.6153*** 
 [0.0847] [0.0888] [0.0956]  [0.1589] [0.1321] [0.1376] 
RESTATE -0.0588 -0.1259 -0.1564  0.6451 0.5437 0.5193 
 [0.2804] [0.2570] [0.2691]  [0.5110] [0.5256] [0.5254] 
Ind FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.0832 0.0903 0.0905  0.0315 0.0395 0.0389 
N 972 1072 1093   972 1072 1093 
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Panel E. Controlling for Managers’ General Ability 
Dependent variable Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE)  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.0810** 0.1047*** 0.1111***  0.0380 0.0676* 0.0782*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0220) (0.0278)  (0.0471) (0.0409) (0.0249) 
GENERAL ABILITY 0.0993*** 0.0888** 0.0909**  0.0604** 0.0580** 0.0560** 
 (0.0269) (0.0298) (0.0323)  (0.0210) (0.0200) (0.0187) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0131 0.0151 0.0199  -0.0190* -0.0194** -0.0183** 
 (0.0286) (0.0243) (0.0242)  (0.0101) (0.0077) (0.0065) 
ROA -0.0022 0.0031 0.0030  -0.0082** -0.0079** -0.0048 
 (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0069)  (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0032) 
RET 0.7344 0.5890 0.9098 1.4599* 1.5069* 1.5719 
(0.8562) (0.8786) (1.3527) (0.7041) (0.8003) (0.9207) 
Log(AGE) -1.7602*** -1.7454*** -1.7354***  -0.4955* -0.5008* -0.4990* 
 (0.1586) (0.1222) (0.1372)  (0.2394) (0.2741) (0.2754) 
Log(TENURE) -0.0665 -0.0752 -0.0806  -0.0061 -0.0132 -0.0135 
 (0.0536) (0.0553) (0.0561)  (0.0313) (0.0296) (0.0293) 
RESTATE -0.0904 -0.0897 -0.0916  0.0367 0.0305 0.0329 
 (0.1508) (0.1549) (0.1574)  (0.1041) (0.1104) (0.1116) 
Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.2531 0.2581 0.2614  0.0832 0.0816 0.0757 
N 349 361 363   349 361 363 
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Table 6 
Instrumental Variables 
 
This table presents estimates of 2SLS regressions of executives’ job market outcomes, New job and Public 
job, on CSR performance of the previous employer (CSR FIRM), with average industry CSR performance 
(IndCSR) as an instrumental variable. Panel A and panel B reports the first stage and second stage results, 
respectively. New job is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job after turnover, and zero 
otherwise. Public job is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job in a public firm after 
turnover, and zero otherwise. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score is 
positive over the one year, two years, or three years measuring window. IndCSR is the average CSR score 
of other firms in the same industry at the year of a CEO's turnover. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA 
is the average industry adjusted ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted 
return over the measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. TENURE is the CEO’s tenure length 
as the original firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are estimated and clustered at the industry level. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A. First Stage 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Industry CSR 0.0765*** 0.0612*** 0.0751*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0190) (0.0227) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0871*** 0.0888*** 0.0842*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0105) (0.0096) 
ROA -0.0027 -0.0027 0.0008 
 (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
RET -0.5060 -1.2975*** -1.2956** 
 (0.3532) (0.4452) (0.5087) 
Log(AGE) 0.2934** 0.2437* 0.2175* 
 (0.1232) (0.1233) (0.1105) 
Log(TENURE) -0.0032 -0.0094 0.0116 
 (0.0259) (0.0251) (0.0230) 
RESTATE 0.0879 0.0207 0.0783 
 (0.0805) (0.0743) (0.0914) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
    
F-test: IndCSR=0 14.1 10.42 10.94 
N 959 1059 1080 
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Panel B. Second Stage 
Dependent Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE)  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.6366** 0.7855** 0.5636*  0.8422*** 0.9881*** 0.7517*** 
 (0.3748) (0.4597) (0.3644)  (0.3447) (0.4208) (0.3218) 
Log(SIZE) -0.0516 -0.0672* -0.0450  -0.0714** -0.0869** -0.0608** 
 (0.0325) (0.0405) (0.0310)  (0.0328) (0.0368) (0.0251) 
ROA 0.0051** 0.0062** 0.0059  0.0015 0.0006 -0.0019 
 (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0041)  (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0022) 
RET 0.4381 1.4578** 1.1054*  0.7697* 1.6786*** 1.0899** 
 (0.4530) (0.7387) (0.6425)  (0.4534) (0.6476) (0.5138) 
Log(AGE) -1.4695*** -1.4689*** -1.4075*** -0.4123** -0.4131** -0.3329** 
(0.1554) (0.1748) (0.1505) (0.1603) (0.1610) (0.1448) 
Log(TENURE) -0.0751*** -0.0736*** -0.0845***  -0.0621*** -0.0608** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0260) (0.0250)  (0.0221) (0.0264) (0.0220) 
RESTATE -0.0443 -0.0215 -0.0539  0.0363 0.0688 0.0324 
 (0.0864) (0.0708) (0.0748)  (0.1102) (0.0978) (0.0946) 
Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
N 959 1059 1080   959 1059 1080 
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Table 7 Duration analysis using the COX Proportional Hazards Model 
 
This table presents estimates of the COX PH model for the relation between the chance of finding an executive position (in Panel A) or finding an 
executive position (in Panel B) within five years of leaving the previous employer and covariates. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one 
if a firm's CSR score is positive over the one year, two years, or three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA is the average 
industry adjusted ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted return over the measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age 
at turnover. TENURE is the CEO’s tenure length as the original firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s 
tenure. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A. Chance of finding a new executive position   
CSR Horizon 1 Year  2 Years  3 Years 
 Coeff (SE)  Hazard Ratio  
Coeff 
(SE)  Hazard Ratio  
Coeff 
(SE)  Hazard Ratio 
CSR FIRM 0.2273***  1.26  0.2582***  1.29  0.2633***  1.30 
 (0.0958)    (0.0958)    (0.0977)   
Log(SIZE) 0.0144  1.01  0.0027  1.00  0.0009  1.00 
 (0.0287)    (0.0266)    (0.0258)   
ROA 0.0051  1.01  0.0059  1.01  0.0104  1.01 
 (0.0069)    (0.0073)    (0.0087)   
RET 0.5906  1.81  1.5172  4.56  0.7581  2.13 
 (1.0909)    (1.3974)    (1.5008)   
Log(AGE) -3.0635***  0.05  -3.0754***  0.05  -3.0599***  0.05 
 (0.3643)    (0.3449)    (0.3411)   
Log(TENURE) -0.2032***  0.82  -0.2173***  0.80  -0.2147***  0.81 
 (0.0645)    (0.0612)    (0.0608)   
RESTATE -0.1836  0.83  -0.1808  0.83  -0.1852  0.83 
 (0.2630)    (0.2540)  1.29  (0.2540)   
            
Chi-square 87.144    102.339    103.509   
N 972    1072    1093   
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Panel B. Chance of finding an executive position in a public firm  
 
CSR Horizon 1 Year  2 Years  3 Years 
 Coeff (SE)  Hazard Ratio  
Coeff 
(SE)  Hazard Ratio  
Coeff 
(SE)  Hazard Ratio 
CSR FIRM 0.4375***  1.55  0.6035***  1.83  0.6223***  1.86 
 (0.1953)    (0.1928)    (0.1969)   
Log(SIZE) 0.0169  1.02  -0.0134  0.99  -0.0027  1.00 
 (0.0599)    (0.0557)    (0.0541)   
ROA -0.0009  1.00  -0.0134  0.99  -0.0093  0.99 
 (0.0163)    (0.0186)    (0.0211)   
RET 3.2541  25.90  3.7251  41.47  1.2136  3.37 
 (2.3157)    (2.9587)    (3.2183)   
Log(AGE) -2.4426***  0.09  -2.5463***  0.08  -2.5219***  0.08 
 (0.8146)    (0.7703)    (0.7664)   
Log(TENURE) -0.5188***  0.60  -0.5625***  0.57  -0.5551***  0.57 
 (0.1397)    (0.1334)    (0.1334)   
RESTATE 0.3591  1.43  0.3080  1.36  0.3028  1.35 
 (0.4226)    (0.4202)    (0.4203)   
            
Chi-square 33.863    44.270    42.444   
N 972    1072    1093   
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Table 8 
Move up within Public placements 
 
This table presents the estimation of the likelihood of finding a CEO position in a larger public firm within five years of leaving the previous 
employer, conditional on finding a job in a public firm. The dependent variable is Move up, a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a CEO 
position at a firm that is in a higher total asset decile, and zero otherwise. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score is 
positive over the one year, two years, or three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA is the average industry adjusted 
ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted return over the measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. 
TENURE is the CEO’s tenure length as the original firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are estimated and clustered at the industry level. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years   1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE)  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.2239** 0.2143*** 0.1858***  0.2432** 0.3264*** 0.1806** 
(0.1013) (0.0759) (0.0552) (0.1122) (0.1055) (0.0902) 
GENERAL ABILITY INDEX 0.0689 0.0344 0.0528 
     (0.1067) (0.1273) (0.1019) 
Log(SIZE) -0.0075 -0.0057 -0.0071  0.0102 -0.0114 0.0068 
 (0.0271) (0.0225) (0.0234)  (0.1015) (0.0756) (0.0795) 
ROA -0.0092** -0.0074 -0.0099  -0.0532* -0.0480*** -0.0494** 
 (0.0030) (0.0054) (0.0077)  (0.0241) (0.0076) (0.0159) 
RET 0.9428 2.0594* 3.0929**  -2.5946 0.2772 5.3347** 
 (0.7676) (1.0707) (1.2616)  (1.9969) (1.7190) (2.1843) 
Log(AGE) 0.4470 0.1997 0.2973  1.0775 0.5897 0.6959* 
 (0.4706) (0.4419) (0.4019)  (0.7056) (0.4522) (0.3338) 
Log(TENURE) -0.1116* -0.1177** -0.1241**  -0.1186 -0.0903 -0.0882 
 (0.0578) (0.0534) (0.0539)  (0.0742) (0.0976) (0.0928) 
RESTATE 0.0218 -0.0512 -0.0786  0.4183*** 0.2145** 0.0586 
 (0.2347) (0.2070) (0.1859)  (0.1247) (0.0822) (0.1899) 
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Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.0843 0.0599 0.0466  0.2335 0.1804 0.1874 
N 151 168 170   68 71 71 
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Table 9 
Forced and Voluntary Turnover Subsample Tests 
 
Panel A and panel B of Table 9 present results for the voluntary turnover subsample and the forced turnover subsample, respectively. New job is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a CEO finds a new job after turnover, and zero otherwise. Public job is a dummy variable that equals one if a 
CEO finds a new job in a public firm after turnover, and zero otherwise. CSR FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's CSR score is 
positive over the one year, two years, or three years measuring window. SIZE is the market capitalization. ROA is the average industry adjusted 
ROA over the measuring window. RET is the average industry adjusted return over the measuring window. AGE is the CEO’s age at turnover. 
TENURE is the CEO’s tenure length as the original firms’ CEO. RESTATE is a dummy variable if there is a restatement in a CEO’s tenure. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are estimated and clustered at the industry level. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A. Voluntary Turnover Subsample 
 
Dependent variable Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.0971** 0.1234*** 0.1082***  0.0812* 0.0955*** 0.0800** 
 (0.0452) (0.0348) (0.0389)  (0.0523) (0.0320) (0.0375) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0205 0.0243 0.0282*  0.0231 0.0235 0.0297 
 (0.0149) (0.0136) (0.0128)  (0.0236) (0.0244) (0.0224) 
ROA 0.0073** 0.0069* 0.0068  0.0030 0.0039 0.0086** 
 (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0060)  (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0038) 
RET 0.6728 0.4677 1.6481  1.8409 1.5549 1.4312 
 (0.4600) (0.8450) (1.1561)  (1.0862) (1.0729) (0.8603) 
Log(AGE) -1.9352*** -1.9136*** -1.9166***  -0.8825*** -0.8804*** -0.8498*** 
 (0.2386) (0.2372) (0.2360)  (0.1809) (0.2083) (0.2290) 
Log(TENURE) -0.1353*** -0.1295** -0.1323**  -0.0530 -0.0633 -0.0651 
 (0.0435) (0.0448) (0.0431)  (0.0389) (0.0364) (0.0368) 
RESTATE -0.5327*** -0.5422*** -0.5280***  -0.0817 -0.0973* -0.0988* 
 (0.0828) (0.0823) (0.0868)  (0.0518) (0.0541) (0.0497) 
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Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.2586 0.2532 0.2547  0.1262 0.1077 0.1094 
N 260 270 271   260 270 271 
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Panel B. Forced Turnover Subsample 
 
Dependent Prob(Finding a new job)   Prob(Finding a job in a public firm) 
CSR Horizon 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE)  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
CSR FIRM 0.0158 0.0248 0.0404  -0.0386 -0.0027 0.0390 
 (0.0550) (0.0424) (0.0397)  (0.0414) (0.0404) (0.0307) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0166 0.0136 0.0186  -0.0178* -0.0231* -0.0286* 
 (0.0168) (0.0163) (0.0169)  (0.0096) (0.0120) (0.0138) 
ROA 0.0026 0.0075 0.0085  -0.0026 -0.0037** -0.0019 
 (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0063)  (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0024) 
RET 0.3272 0.1477 0.5372  0.5899 0.8008 1.3272 
 (0.8418) (0.8359) (0.8849)  (0.3731) (0.7185) (0.7944) 
Log(AGE) -0.4955 -0.5895 -0.6241 0.2022 0.1484 0.1504 
(0.5021) (0.4416) (0.4429) (0.1320) (0.1333) (0.1378) 
Log(TENURE) -0.1168** -0.1159* -0.1287*  -0.0624* -0.0677** -0.0706** 
 (0.0512) (0.0600) (0.0586)  (0.0319) (0.0280) (0.0298) 
RESTATE 0.0130 0.0251 0.0168  0.1145 0.1037 0.0957 
 (0.1394) (0.1428) (0.1511)  (0.1229) (0.1367) (0.1430) 
Industry FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
        
Adjusted R2 0.1232 0.1357 0.1372  0.0291 0.0321 0.0374 
N 241 251 252   241 251 252 
 
 
 
 
